

Chapter 12: Intrusion Data Analysis Instructor Materials

CCNA Cybersecurity Operations V1.1



Chapter 12: Intrusion Data Analysis

CCNA Cybersecurity Operations v1.1 Planning Guide





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CCNA Cybersecurity Operations v1.1



Chapter 12 - Sections & Objectives

- 12.1 Evaluating Alerts
 - Explain the process of evaluating alerts.
 - Identify the structure of alerts.
 - Explain how alerts are classified.
- 12.2 Working with Network Security Data
 - Interpret data to determine the source of an alert.
 - Explain how data is prepared for use in a Network Security Monitoring (NSM) system.
 - Use Security Onion tools to investigate network security events.
 - Describe network monitoring tools that enhance workflow management.
- 12.3 Digital Forensics
 - Explain how the cybersecurity analyst handles digital forensics and evidence to ensure proper attack attribution.
 - Explain the role of digital forensic processes.

12.1 Evaluating Alerts

Sources of Alerts Security Onion

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- Security Onion is an open-source suite of Network Security Monitoring (NSM) tools that run on an Ubuntu Linux distribution.
- Some components of Security Onion are owned and maintained by corporations, such as Cisco and Riverbend Technologies, but are made available as open source.




Security Onion is a suite of Network Security Monitoring (NSM) tools for evaluating alerts, providing three core functions to the cybersecurity analyst:

- · Full packet capture and data types
- · Network-based and host-based intrusion detection systems
- Alert analysis tools


Sources of Alerts Detection Tools for Collection

- CapME provides the cybersecurity analyst with an easy-to-read means of viewing an entire Layer 4 session.
- Snort uses rules and signatures to generate alerts.
- Bro uses policies, in the form of scripts that determine what data to log and when to issue alert notifications.
- OSSEC actively monitors host system operations, including conducting file integrity monitoring, local log monitoring, system process monitoring, and rootkit detection.
- Suricata uses native multithreading, which allows the distribution of packet stream processing across multiple processor cores.



Sources of Alerts Analysis Tools

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- Sguil This provides a high-level cybersecurity analysts' console for investigating security alerts from a wide variety of sources.
- ELSA Logging sources such as HIDS, NIDS, firewalls, syslog clients and servers, domain services, and others can be configured to make their logs available to ELSA databases.
- Wireshark This is a packet capture application that is integrated into the Security Onion suite.

Sources of Alerts Alert Generation


- Alerts are generated in Security Onion by many sources including Snort, Bro, Suricata, and OSSEC, among others.
- Sguil provides a console that integrates alerts from multiple sources into a timestamped queue.
- Alerts will generally include the following fivetuples information:
 - SrcIP the source IP address for the event.
 - SPort the source (local) Layer 4 port for the event.
 - DstIP the destination IP for the event.
 - DPort the destination Layer 4 port for the event.
 - Pr the IP protocol number for the event.



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	3 second		1.42	2017-06-30 14:39:31			0.0.0.0		0	IOSSEC Integrity checksam changed again (3rd time).
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Sources of Alerts Rules and Alerts

- Alerts can come from a number of sources:
 - NIDS Snort, Bro and Suricata
 - HIDS OSSEC
 - Asset management and monitoring Passive Asset Detection System (PADS)
 - HTTP, DNS, and TCP transactions Recorded by Bro and pcaps
 - Syslog messages Multiple sources



Rule

Sources of Alerts Snort Rule Structure

- Snort rules consist of the rule header and rule options.
 - Rule header contains the action, protocol, addressing, and port information
 - Rule options include the text message that identifies the alert also metadata about the alert.
- Snort rules come from a variety of sources including Emerging Threats (ET), SourceFire, and Cisco Talos.

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
 PulledPork is a Security Onion component that can download new rules automatically from snort.org.

alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"GPL ATTACK_RESPONSE id check returned root";
<pre>content:"uid=0 28 root 29 "; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2100498;</pre>
rev:8;)
/nem/server data/securityonion/rules/seconion-eth1-1/downloaded rules.Line 602


Component	Explanation
rule header	contains the action to be taken, source and destination addresses and ports, and the direction of traffic flow
rule options	includes the message to be displayed, details of packet content, alert type, source ID, and additional details, such as a reference for the rule or vulnerability
rule location	added by Sguil to indicate the location of the rule in the Security Onion file structure and in the specified rule file

Sources of Alerts

Lab – Snort and Firewall Rules



Overview of Alert Evaluation The Need for Alert Evaluation



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- Exploits will inevitably evade protection measures, no matter how sophisticated they may be.
- Detection rules should be overly conservative.
- It is necessary to have skilled cybersecurity analysts investigate alerts to determine if an exploit has actually occurred.
- Tier 1 cybersecurity analysts will work through queues of alerts in a tool like Sguil, pivoting to tools like Bro, Wireshark, and ELSA.

Overview of Alert Evaluation Evaluating Alerts

- Alerts can be classified as follows:
 - True Positive: The alert has been verified to be an actual security incident.
 - False Positive: The alert does not indicate an actual security incident.
 - True Negative: No security incident has occurred.
 - False Negative: An undetected incident has occurred.

When an alert is issued, it	When an alert is issued, it will receive one of four possible classifications									
	True	False								
Positive (Alert exists)	Incident occurred	No incident occurred								
Negative (No alert exists)	No incident occurred	Incident occurred								
Events classified as 'true" are des	sired.									

Overview of Alert Evaluation

Deterministic Analysis and Probabilistic Analysis

- Statistical techniques can be used to evaluate the risk that exploits will be successful in a given network.
 - Deterministic Analysis evaluates risk based on what is known about a vulnerability.
 - **Probabilistic Analysis** estimates the potential success of an exploit by estimating the likelihood that if one step in an exploit has successfully been completed that the next step will also be successful.


Types of Analysis

- Deterministic Analysis For an exploit to be successful, all prior steps in the exploit must also be successful. The cybersecurity analyst knows the steps for a successful exploit.
- **Probabilistic Analysis** Statistical techniques predict the probability that an exploit will occur based on the likelihood that each step in the exploit will succeed.

12.2 Working with Network Security Data



A Common Data Platform ELSA




 Enterprise Log Search and Archive (ELSA) is an enterprise-level tool for searching and archiving NSM data that originates from multiple sources.

 ELSA is able to normalize log file entries into a common schema that can then be displayed in the ELSA web interface.

 ELSA receives logs over Syslog-NG, stores logs in MySQL databases, and indexes using Sphinx Search.

A Common Data Platform **Data Reduction**

- Data reduction is the identification of data that should be gathered and stored to reduce the burden on systems.
- By limiting the volume of data, tools like ELSA will be far more useful.



A Common Data Platform Data Normalization

 Data normalization is the process of combining data from a number of sources into a common format for indexing and searching.

Info	Mon Jun 19 23:46:27	1.1 curl/7.52.1 0 327 301 Moved Permane host=127.0.0.1 program=bro_http class=BR	bal209.165.201.17 51810 209.165.200.235 80 1 GET 209.165.200.235 /testmyids - ently - - (empty) - - - - FsjFMLpVbNYYItCDb - text/html IO_HTTP_srcip=209.165.201.17_srcpori=51810_dstip=209.165.200.235_dstpori=80_ od=GET_site=209.165.200.235_uri=/testmyids_referer=_user_agent=curl/7.52.1_
Bro	Log Format	Fielde	Normalized and Labelled ELSA Log Format Fields
	Log Format 7915981.5		Normalized and Labelled ELSA Log Format Fields Mon Jun 19 23:46:27
149	7915981.5		Mon Jun 19 23:46:27
149 209	7915981.5	33031	Mon Jun 19 23:46:27 srcip=209.165.201.17 srcport=51810

A Common Data Platform Data Archiving



- Retaining NSM data indefinitely is not feasible due to storage and access issues.
- Compliance frameworks may require storage of data for a specified period of time.
- ELSA can be configured to retain data for a period of time. The default is 90 days.
- Sguil alert data is retained for 30 days by default.

A Common Data Platform

Lab – Convert Data Into a Universal Format

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Lab - Convert Data into a Universal Format

Objectives

Part 1: Normalize Timestamps in a Log File

Part 2: Normalize Timestamps in an Apache Log File

Part 3: Log File Preparation in Security Onion

Background / Scenario

Log entries are generated by network devices, operating systems, applications, and various types of programmable devices. A file containing a time-sequenced stream of log entries is called a *log file*.

By nature, log files record events that are relevant to the source. The syntax and format of data within log messages are often defined by the application developer.

Therefore, the terminology used in the log entries often varies from source to source. For example, depending on the source, the terms login, logon, authentication event, and user connection, may all appear in log entries to describe a successful user authentication to a server.

It is often desirable to have a consistent and uniform terminology in logs generated by different sources. This is especially true when all log files are being collected by a centralized point.

The term *normalization* refers to the process of converting parts of a message, in this case a log entry, to a common format.

Investigating Network Data Working in Sguil

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	1210	seconion	7.122	2017-07-05 18:38:17	209.165.201.17	36605	209.165.200.235	80	6	ET SCAN	Possible	Nmap L	ser
	1033	seconion	1.23	2017-06-19 23:18:28	0.0.0.9		0.0.0.0		0	(OSSEC)	Received	10 packe	ts in
RT .	63	seconion	7.1	2017-06-19 23:19:00	209.165.201.17		192.168.0.1		1	GPL ICM	IP JNFO	PING *N	IX
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	24	seconion	1.8	2017-06-19 23:09:26	0.0.0.0		0.0.0.0		0	(OSSEC)	Integrity	checks	m c
π	19	seconion	5.25	2017-06-20 15:02:27	209.165.201.17		209.165.200.235		1	GPL ICM	PJNFO	PING *N	IX.
π	10	seconion	5.13	2017-06-19 23:38:49	209.165.200.226	6	209.165.200.235		1	GPL ICM	IP_INFO	PING *N	IX
	8	seconion	1.13	2017-06-19 23:10:40	0.0.0.0		0.0.0.0		0	(OSSEC)	Integrity	checks	m c
		seconion	5.99	2017-07-05 18:38:18	209.165.201.17	37354	209.165.200.235	80	6	ET WEB	SERVER	ColdFusi	ana
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- In Security Onion, the first place that a cybersecurity analyst will go to verify alerts is Sguil.
- Sguil automatically correlates similar alerts into a single line and provides a way to view correlated events represented by that line.

Investigating Network Data Sguil Queries

- Queries can be constructed in Sguil using the Query Builder, which simplifies constructing queries.
- Cybersecurity analyst must know the field names and some issues with field values.

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Investigating Network Data Pivoting from Sguil

- Sguil provides the ability to "pivot" the investigation to other tools such as ELSA, Wireshark, or Bro.
- Log files are available in ELSA, relevant packet captures can be displayed in Wireshark, and transcripts of TCP sessions and Bro information are also available.

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RT	8	seconion	Transcript Transcript (force new) Wireshark Wireshark (force new)	38:22	209.165.200.235	80	209.165.201.17	38720	6	GPL WEB	SERVER 403	Forbidde	
RT	1	seconion		38:25	209.165.201.17	34902	209,165.200.235	6667	6	ET CHAT IS	RC NICK con	mmand	
RT	1	seconion		38:25	209.165.201.17	34902	209.165.200.235	6667	6	ET CHAT IN	RC NICK con	mmand	
	6	seconion		38:27	209.165.201.17	40694	209.165.200.235	80	6	ET WEB_SE	RVER Scrip	t tag in U.	
	3	seconion	NetworkMin	er er (force new)	38:29	209.165.201.17	40754	209.165.200.235	80	6	ET SCAN N	MAP SQL S	pider Sca
10	3	seconion	Bro	er (force new)	38:29	209.165.201.17	40754	209.165.200.235	80	6	ET SCAN N	MAP SQL S	pider Sca
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RT	1	seconion	7.1961	2017-07-05 1	8:39:08	209.165.201.17	43276	209.165.200.235	8180	6	GPL WEB	SERVER Ora	cle Java
RT	1	seconion	5.2558	2017-07-05 1	8:53:42	209.165.200.235	80	209.165.201.17	41258	6	ET ATTACK	RESPONS	E Output.
		n) Agent Sta S ⊽ Enable I		tatistics) Synte	m Maga	Show Packet	Data 🗆 S	Dest IP	Ver HL TI	DS le	n ID F	lags Offset	TTL Chk
Dst IP: Dst Nam Nhois Q		• None	Src IP C Ds	t IP		TCP Source Port	e Dest R Port 1	UAPRSF RRCSSYI OGKHTNN S	eq#	Ack #	Offset I	tes Windov	v Urp Chk
						DATA					-		

Investigating Network Data Event Handling in Sguil

e Query Reports Sound: Off Serv	erName: localhost UserN	ame: analyst UserI	D: 2					2017-07-20	17:40:16 GM
tealTime Events Escalated Events									
ST 🛛 Sensor Alert ID	Date/Time	Src 1P	SPort	Dst 1P	DPort	Pr	Event Me	sage	
1213 seconion 5.55	2017-07-05 18:38:17	209.165.201.17	36606	209.165.200.235	80	6	ET SCAN N	Imap Scriptie	ng Engin
reate AutoCat From Event	2017-07-05 18:38:17	209.165.201.17	36606	209.165.200.235	80	6	ET SCAN N	emap Scriptie	g Engin
xpire Event As NA (F8)	2017-07-05 18:38:17	209.165.201.17	36606	209.165.200.235	80	6	ET SCAN P	ossible Nma	p User
spire Event As NA With Comment	2017-07-05 18:38:17	209.165.201.17	36606	209.165.200.235	80	6	ET SCAN P	ossible Nma	p User
uick Query	2017-06-19 23:18:28	0.0.0.0		0.0.0.0		0	(OSSEC) R	eceived 0 pac	kets in
dvanced Query	2017-06-19 23:19:00	209.165.201.17		192.168.0.1		1	GPL ICMP	INFO PING	*NIX
pdate Event Status	Escalate (F9)			209.165.201.17		1	GPL ICMP	INFO PING	*NIX
24 seconion 1.8	Cat I: Unauthorized Root	Access (F1)		0.0.0.0		0	(OSSEC) In	tegrity check	ksum c
RT 19 seconion-5.25	Cat I: Add Comment Cat II: Unauthorized User	A		209.165.200.235		1	GPL ICMP	INFO PING	*NIX
RT 10 seconion 5.13	Cat II: Add Comment	Access (F2)	- 1	209.165.200.235		1	GPL ICMP	INFO PING	*NIX
8 seconion 1.13	Cat III: Attempted Unauti	harized Arress (F3)		0.0.0.0		0	(OSSEC) In	tegrity check	ksum c
8 seconion 5.99	Cat III: Add Comment	nanaea recess (r sj		209.165.200.235	80	6	ET WEB S	ERVER ColdFe	usion a
8 seconion 5.100	Cat IV: Successful Denial o	of Service Attack (F4)		209.165.200.235	80	6	ET WEB, SI	ERVER ColdFi	usion p
	Cat IV: Add Comment								
IP Resolution Agent Status Snor	Cat V: Poor Security Pract	ice or Policy Violatio	n (FS)	how Rule					
Reverse DNS 🖓 Enable External DN	Cat V: Add Comment								
re IP:	Cat VI: Reconnaissance/Pi	robes/Scans (F6)	- 1	Dest IP	Ver HL 1	ros le	n ID I	lags Offset	TTL ChkSun
rc Name:	Cat VI: Add Comment		- 1			-			1
st IP:	Cat VII: Virus Infection(F7	0		UAPRSF					
st Name:	Cat VII: Add Comment		1	RRCSSYI					
	Dst IP	Port	Port 1	OGKHTNN S	eq #	Ack #	Offset	Res Window	Urp ChkSun
non-query. None sicar	DA IT		1 1		_		_	_	
		DATA							
						_			

- Three tasks can be completed in Sguil to manage alerts.
 - Alerts that have been found to be false positives can be expired.
 - An event can be escalated by pressing the F9 key.
 - An event can be categorized.


Investigating Network Data Working in ELSA

- ELSA provides access to a large number of log file entries.
- ELSA will only retrieve the first 100 records for the previous 48 hours.
- The easiest way to see information in ELSA is to issue the built-in queries that appear to the left of the ELSA window and then adjust the dates and resubmit the query using the Submit Query button.


Adjus	ing Search Scope by Date
	ELSA - Christilium
← → C ▲ Not secure biter1./localhost/risa/	
Security Minian	ELSA - Admin -
Connections	Query class=BRO_HTTP "-* srcip="209.165.201.17" From 2017-06-19 19:58:34 To UTC Add Term •
DHCP	start (X 0) [Grouped by srcip] (Class=BRO
DNP3	 ✓ June 2017 → <201.17* (950) ×
DNS	Su Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa (1) class(1) srcip(1) srcport(48) dstip(1) dst
Eiles Firewall	28 29 30 33 1 2 3 4 5 4 7 8 8 10 first < prev 1 2 3 4 5 6 Z
FIP	13 17 13 14 15 16 17 19 19 20 21 22 23 24
Host Logs	25 26 27 28 29 30 1
HTTP Top / Bottom Client IPs	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0.1 program=bro_http class=BRO_HTTP so #301 content_length=327 method=GET site text/html
Top / Bottom Server IPs	Close Close .533024/CmJwPc1OCHpl8ittk8/209.165.2
Top / Bottom Server Ports Top / Bottom Status Codes Top / Bottom File Types Top / Bottom User Agents	Mon Jun 19 23:46:27 [1.1]curl/7.52.1[0]327[301]Moved Permanently[-[-[(em hosi=12Z.0.0.1 trogram=bito_http://duss=BRO_HTLP:status_code=301 content_length=322 method=GEI sit mime_typic=text/html
Iop / Bottom Sites Top / Bottom Sites hosting EXEs Top / Bottom Sites hosting CABs Top / Bottom Sites hosting JARs Top / Bottom Sites hosting RARs Top / Bottom Sites hosting SWFs	Mon Jun 19 23:46:44 1497915998.731728[CnuSu83sjeu5OwiF4i]209.165.2 Inlo Mon Jun 19 23:46:44 149791598.731728[CnuSu83sjeu5OwiF4i]209.165.2 Inlo 23:46:44 149791598.731728[CnuSu83sjeu5OwiF4i]209.165.2 Inlo 23:46:44 149791598.731728[CnuSu83sjeu5OwiF4i]209.165.2 Inlo 23:46:44 149791598.731728[CnuSu83sjeu5OwiF4i]209.165.2 Inlo 23:46:44 149791598.731728[CnuSu83sjeu5OwiF4i]209.165.2<
Top / Bottom Sites hosting 21Ps Top / Bottom Potential SQL Injection	Info Mon Jun 19 Mon Jun 2010 Mile class=BRO_HTTP so

Investigating Network Data Queries in ELSA

- ELSA provides field summary and value information for every field that is indexed in the query results. This permits refining queries based on a wide range of values.
- Clicking an entry in the Value column will display the query with the value added to the previous query. This process can be repeated to narrow down search results easily.
- Regular expressions are executed in ELSA using the grep function.



Investigating Network Data Investigating Process or API Calls



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- If malware can fool an OS kernel into allowing it to make system calls, many exploits are possible.
- OSSEC rules detect changes in hostbased parameters like the execution of software processes, changes in user privileges, and registry modifications, among others.
- OSSEC rules will trigger an alert in Sguil.
- Choosing OSSEC as the source program in ELSA results in a view of the OSSEC events that occurred on the host.

Investigating Network Data Investigating File Details

- When ELSA is opened directly, a query short cut exists for Files.
- Opening the Files queries and selecting Mime Types in the menu displays a list of the types of files that have been downloaded.
- MD5 and SHA-1 hashes for downloaded files are also available.
- File hash values can be submitted to online sites to determine if the file is known malware.



Investigating Network Data

Lab – Regular Expression Tutorial

CISCO. Academy

Lab – Regular Expression Tutorial

Objectives

In this lab, you will learn how to use regular expressions to search for desired strings of information.

Background / Scenario

A regular expression (regex) is a pattern of symbols that describes data to be matched in a query or other operation. Regular expressions are constructed similarly to arithmetic expressions, by using various operators to combine smaller expressions. There are two major standards of regular expression, POSIX and Perl.

In this lab, you will use an online tutorial to explore regular expressions. You will also describe the information that matches given regular expressions.

Required Resources

- CyberOps Workstation VM
- Internet connection

Step 1: Complete the regexone.com tutorial.

a. Open a web browser and navigate to <u>https://regexone.com/</u>. Regex One is a tutorial that provides you with lessons to learn about regular expression patterns.

Investigating Network Data

Lab – Extract an Executable from a PCAP

CISCO. Academy

Lab – Extract an Executable from a PCAP

Objectives

Part 1: Prepare the Virtual Environment

Part 2: Analyze Pre-Captured Logs and Traffic Captures

Background / Scenario

Looking at logs is very important but it is also important to understand how network transactions happen at the packet level.

In this lab, you will analyze the traffic in a previously captured pcap file and extract an executable from the file.

Required Resources

- CyberOps Workstation VM
- Internet connection

Part 1: Prepare the Virtual Environment

a. Launch Oracle VirtualBox. Right-click CyberOps Workstion > Settings > Network. Besides Attached To, select Bridged Adapter, if necessary, and click OK.

Enhancing the Work of the Cybersecurity Analyst Dashboards and Visualizations

- Dashboards provide an interactive combination of data and visualizations designed to improve the value of large amounts of information.
- Allow analysts to focus on specific details and information
- ELSA capable of designing custom dashboards
- Squert provides a visual interface
- Cisco Talos provides an interactive dashboard



Enhancing the Work of the Cybersecurity Analyst Workflow Management

- Network security monitoring requires workflows to be managed.
 - Enhances efficiency of the cyberoperations team
 - Increases the accountability of staff

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- · Ensures that all potential alerts are treated properly
- Each alert should be systematically assigned, processed, and documented
- Sguil provides basic workflow management but not a good choice for large operations, third party systems are available that can be customized
- Automated queries add efficiency to workflow
 - Search for complex security incidents that may evade other tools
 - ELSA query can be configured as an alert rule and run regularly
 - Can be created in a scripting language such as Python

12.3 Digital Forensics




Evidence Handling and Attack Attribution Digital Forensics

- Cybersecurity analyst will uncover evidence of criminal activity.
 - Must identify threat actors, report them to the appropriate authorities, and provide evidence to support prosecution.
 - Usually first to uncover wrong doing.
- Digital forensics is the recovery and investigation of information found on digital devices as it relates to criminal activity.
 - Could be data on storage devices, in volatile computer memory, or traces of cybercrime in network data such as pcaps and logs
- Cybercriminal activity can be characterized as origination from inside or outside of the organization.
- Under HIPAA, notification of breach must be made to the affected individuals.
- Analysts must know the requirements regarding the preservation and handling of evidence.

Evidence Handling and Attack Attribution The Digital Forensics Process

- NIST describes the digital forensics process as involving four steps:
 - 1. Collection Identification of potential sources of forensic data and acquisition, handling, and storage of that data.
 - 2. Examination Assessing and extracting relevant information from the collected data. May involve decompression and decryption.
 - 3. Analysis Drawing conclusions from the data. (People, places, time, events, etc.)
 - 4. Reporting Preparing and presenting information. Suggestions for further investigation and next steps should be made.




Evidence Handling and Attack Attribution Types of Evidence

- In legal proceedings, evidence is broadly classified:
 - **Direct evidence** was indisputably in the possession of the accused, or is eyewitness evidence from someone who observed criminal behavior.
 - **Best evidence** is evidence that is in its original state.
 - Corroborating evidence supports an assertion that is developed from best evidence.
 - **Indirect evidence**, in combination with other facts, establishes a hypothesis. Also know as circumstantial evidence.

Evidence Handling and Attack Attribution Evidence Collection Order

- Collection of digital evidence should begin in order from the most volatile evidence and proceed to the least volatile.
 - Data in RAM is most volatile.
- Example most volatile to least volatile:
 - 1. Memory registers, caches
 - 2. Routing table, ARP cache, process table, kernel statistics, RAM
 - 3. Temporary files systems
 - 4. Non-volatile media, fixed and removable
 - 5. Remote logging and monitoring data
 - 6. Physical interconnections and topologies
 - 7. Archival media, tape or other backups



Evidence Handling and Attack Attribution Chain of Custody

- Chain of custody involves the collection, handling, and secure storage of evidence.
 - Who discovered the evidence.
 - All details about the handling of evidence including times, places, and personnel involved.
 - Who has primary responsibility for the evidence, when responsibility was assigned, and when custody changed.
 - Who has physical access to the evidence while it was stored? Access should be restricted to only the most essential personnel.



Evidence Handling and Attack Attribution Data Integrity and Preservation

- Digital evidence should be preserved in its original condition.
 - Original evidence should be copied, and analysis should only be conducted on copies.
 - Timestamps may be part of evidence so opening files from the original media should be avoided.
- Process used to create copies of evidence should be recorded.
- Special tools should be used to preserve forensic evidence before the device is shut down and evidence is lost.
- Users should not disconnect, unplug, or turn off infected machine unless told to by security personnel.



Evidence Handling and Attack Attribution Attack Attribution


- Threat attribution is the act of determining the individual, organization, or nation responsible for a successful intrusion or attack incident.
- Identification of threat actors should occur through principled and systematic investigation of evidence.
- In an evidence-based investigation, the incident response team correlates the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TPP) that were used in the incident with other known exploits to identify threat actors.
- Aspects of a threat that can aid in attribution are the location of originating hosts or domains, features of the codes used in malware, the tools used, and other techniques.



12.4 Chapter Summary




Chapter Summary Lab – Interpret HTTP and DNS Data to Isolate Threat Actor



Chapter Summary

Lab – Isolate Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple



Chapter Summary Summary

- Security Onion provides an integrated NSM environment for investigating security events that are created by diverse systems.
- A Tier 1 cybersecurity analyst evaluates security alerts to verify whether actual security incidents have occurred.
- ELSA provides a common data platform for the aggregation of log files from many sources.
- Sguil provides an analyst's console that enables the investigation of alerts through pivots to other tools.
- Tier 1 analysts may discover illegal activity on the network and be required to handle, preserve, and analyze digital forensic evidence.
- Digital forensic evidence can lead to the attribution of cybersecurity events to threat actors.

Chapter 12 New Terms and Commands

Attack attribution	• ELSA
Best evidence	False Negative
CapME	False Positive
 chain of custody 	Indirect evidence
Corroborating evidence	OSSEC
Dashboard	 Probabilistic analysis
Data normalization	Suricata
Deterministic analysis	True Negative
Digital Forensics	True Positive

- This chapter covers the following areas in the Cybersecurity Operations Certification:
- From 210-250 SECFND Understanding Cisco Cybersecurity Fundamentals:
- Domain 5: Security Monitoring
 - 5.2 Describe the following types of data used in security monitoring:
 - Full packet capture
 - Session Data
 - Transaction Data
 - Statistical Data
 - Extracted content
 - Alert Data

- This chapter covers the following areas in the Cybersecurity Operations Certification:
- From 210-255 SECFND Implementing Cisco Cybersecurity Operation:
- Domain 2: Network Intrusion Analysis
 - 2.8 Compare and contrast impact and no impact for the following:
 - False Positive
 - False Negative
 - True Positive
 - True Negative

Domain 4: Data and Event Analysis

- 4.1 Describe the process of data normalization
- 4.2 Interpret common data values into a universal format
- 4.3 Describe 5-tuple correlation

- This chapter covers the following areas in the Cybersecurity Operations Certification:
- From 210-255 SECFND Implementing Cisco Cybersecurity Operation:
- Domain 4: Data and Event Analysis
 - 4.1 Describe the process of data normalization
 - 4.2 Interpret common data values into a universal format
 - 4.3 Describe 5-tuple correlation
 - 4.4 Apply the 5-tuple approach to isolate a compromised host in a grouped set of logs
 - 4.9 Compare and contrast deterministic and probabilistic analysis

- This chapter covers the following areas in the Cybersecurity Operations Certification:
- From 210-255 SECFND Implementing Cisco Cybersecurity Operation:
- Domain 5: Incident Handling
 - 5.2 Apply the NIST.SP800-61 r2 incident handling process to an event
 - 5.3 Define the following activities as they relate to incident handling:
 - Identification
 - Scoping
 - Containment
 - Remediation
 - Lessons based hardening
 - Reporting

- This chapter covers the following areas in the Cybersecurity Operations Certification:
- From 210-255 SECFND Implementing Cisco Cybersecurity Operation:
- Domain 5: Incident Handling
 - 5.4 Describe the following concepts as they are documented in NIST SP800-86:
 - Evidence collection order
 - Data integrity
 - Data preservation
 - Volatile data collection

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